G.W. Leibniz’s Anti-Death Perspective: Spontaneity of Death and Absolute Immortality by Pasini, Enrico
Pre-print: to appear in C. Tandy (ed.) Death and Anti-Death, vol. 14, Ria U.P. 2016
G.W. Leibniz’s Anti-Death Perspective: Spontaneity 
of Death and Absolute Immortality
Enrico Pasini
1. In 1775, nearly sixty years after Leibniz’s own death, a booklet
appeared in Halle. Modeled after David Fassmann’s series of
Gespräche im Reiche der Todten (“Dialogues in the realm of the
dead”), who had introduced into Germany the vogue of the
Dialogues des morts, Fontenelle’s and Fénelon’s take at the
dialogues-of-the-dead genre that sourced from Lucian’s satirical
archetype, it was titled Plato und Leibnitz jenseits des Styx (“Plato
and Leibniz beyond the Styx”). 1
      The mise en scène featured the two philosophers strolling
together in the hereafter, forgetful of all their past deeds and
thoughts: they discuss the permanence of personality in afterlife
and, while Plato again puts forward reminiscencies of life past,
Leibniz takes objection to it and argues that changes in the organic
body must of necessity entail a disconnection in memories and
thoughts. Now, either they have the same body as they had in the
preceding life, and in such case ought to recall everything of it; or
they do not, and thus will not be able to remember anything. This,
in the intention of the anonymous author, serves both to disqualify
Platonic reminiscence of innate ideas, a purpose on which Leibniz
would have agreed up to a certain point, and to make of Leibniz an
advocate of the dependence of ideas—that is, of any mental
content—from the modifications of our body: consequently, as we
have seen, if the same body is not there, then any recollection of
one’s previous life is impossible. 2
1 See Anon., 1775. On Fassmann, see Dreyfürst 2014. 
2 Christian Jacob Kraus, the eventual introducer of Adam
Smith’s  works to Germany, planned a review of this work, and
a sketch is extant in his Werke as Beilage 2 to Kraus 1819,
425-457, where the passage we are considering (Anon., 1775,
32) is discussed at p. 454. 
      The only public reaction came from a popular philosopher,
H.A. Pistorius, who reviewed it and tried to slash this all too
naturalist perspective; as a “Recensenten diesseit des Styx” (1777,
257) he felt unmoved by the experimental arguments and repelled
by the theoretic ones. And he could not imagine Leibniz maintain
an argument that could entail the mortality of the soul. This meant
confusing Minerva’s beloved, who had laid out the plans of the
divine wisdom for the best of possible worlds, with a phantom
who sought to demonstrate the impossibility of that very plan:
der Liebling Minervens, der diese Gründe und diesen Plan
der ewigen Weisheit billiget, mir unendlich besser gefällt,
als dies traurige Phantom, das die Unmöglichkeit des
besten Plans demonstrieren will. Heu! quantum mutatus
ab illo! (Pistorius 1777, 261)
      The reasonings of this ‘phantom Leibniz’ incorporated indeed
some true Leibnizian ideas, in particular that no soul can ever be
without a body. As he wrote in the preface to the New Essays on
Human Understanding : “all souls, all simple created substances,
are always joined to a body, and […] souls are never completely
separated from bodies” (AG, 298; A VI 6, 58); 3 and in the
Monadology, §72, we read: “there are also no completely
separated souls, nor spirits [Genies] without bodies. God alone is
completely detached from bodies” (AG, 222; GP 6, 619).
      Nevertheless, Leibniz had developed and presented an
argument concerning immortality that was precisely the opposite
of what beyond-the-Styx forgetfulness would have him frame in
the dialogue: that is, that after-death memory is needed by the very
idea of a morally relevant immortality of the soul: “For without
memory immortality would be worthless” (L, 337; A II 2, 81). It
first appears in texts unknown to the 18th century, like the
Discourse on metaphysics, at §34:
For it is memory or the knowledge of this self that renders
it capable of punishment or reward. Thus the immortality
3 Abbreviations for Leibniz’s writings (largely the same used in
Studia Leibnitiana) are detailed in the Reference List. 
required in morality and religion does not consist merely
in this perpetual subsistence common to all substances, for
without the memory of what one has been, there would be
nothing desirable about it. (AG 66; A VI 4, 1584)
      There is a strong connection with a memory-based theory of
personal identity: should an ordinary citizen “all of a sudden
becomes the king of China”, on the condition of completely
forgetting what he had been, practically, “wouldn't that be the
same,” Leibniz writes, “as if he were annihilated and a king of
China created at the same instant in his place?” (AG 66; A VI 4,
1584). 4 Leibniz would explain this connection better in later
works, that would be published by him, as the Theodicy in 1710,
or in not-too-posthumous editions, like the New Essays in 1765. In
§89 of the Theodicy, Leibniz makes an important distinction
between ‘indestructibility’ and ‘immortality,’ “whereby is
understood in the case of man that not only the soul but also the
personality subsists […] what makes the identity of the person”.
This requires conserving “the consciousness, or the reflective
inward feeling” (GP 6, 151). 5 On the one hand, this allows
Leibniz to endow beasts with memory, and with imperishable
souls, without bestowing on them ‘true’ immortality. On the other
hand, memory remains as the foundation of this reflective
sentiment: “cognitionem sui, sive memoriam priorum” (A VI 4,
531), memory of previous things, as he had written already in
1683. He explains in the New Essays that, although we can be
deceived by a memory across an interval of time, 
a present or immediate memory, the memory of what was
taking place immediately before—or in other words, the
consciousness or reflection which accompanies inner
activity—cannot naturally deceive us. If it could, we
would not even be certain that we are thinking about such
and such a thing; for this too is silently said only about
4 See also the letter to Molanus translated in AG, 243. On 18th-
century—especially Wolffian—developments of Leibniz’s
theory of identity, see Thiel (2011, ch. 9 and 10).
5 I am quoting the Theodicy from the Haggard translation, easily
available in a variety of printed and electronic forms.
past actions. (RB, 238; NE II 27, §13; A VI 6, 238)
      This process, Leibniz clarifies, can stand minor interruptions,
such as drunkness, sleep, delirium, since the witness of others can
suffice to reestablish continuity in the personal apperception of
one’s actions. Thus a more or less complex memory-based process
seems to provide the fundamental connection (precisely that
connection that Hume will take issue with) between the successive
elements—the various states—of self-conscious, moral, rational
personalities that are capable of meaningful immortality.
2. Leibniz has no good feeling about death. To him, death means
not peace or rest, or, in later 18th-century vogue, past greatness
alluded to by a pleasurable ruine, but sheer absence of life—and
life is good, coextensive with true unity and real being as a
character of individual soul-like substances, or monads. In the
universe, he often declares, there is nothing dead, nothing, as he
writes in the famous §69 of the Monadology, incapable of life:
Thus there is nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the
universe, no chaos and no confusion except in appearance,
almost as it looks in a pond at a distance, where we might
see the confused and, so to speak, teeming motion of the
fish in the pond, without discerning the fish themselves
(AG 222; GP 6, 618-9)
      A distinction betwen ‘dead’ and ‘living’ forces has particular
importance in Leibniz’s dynamics. Force is in fact twofold:
One force is elementary, which I also call dead force,
since motion does not yet exist in it, but only a solicitation
to motion, as with the ball in the tube, or a stone in a sling
while it is still being held in by a rope. The other force is
ordinary force, joined with actual motion, which I call
living force. (AG 121; GM ) 
      ‘Dead force’ is an infinitesimal force that equals the Cartesian
quantity of motion; such forces characterize equilibrium without
motion, or the beginning of motions. Leibnizian dynamics is born
out of a law of conservation of ‘living’ forces (mv2, like kinetic
energy), which will be the object of hefty debates for a century.
Leibniz’s monads, living soul-like sources of true metaphysical
unity, and the only real beings in the created universe, are
identified in turn with centers of force, principles of action. To
designate this aspect Leibniz revives the Aristotelian word
‘entelechy’. This character of substances is the bridge between
metaphysics and physics, since, as we read in Leibniz’s
correspondence with Johann Bernoulli, matter and material bodies
arise from the ‘complication’ (interaction) of primitive forces: 
However, I think that primitive entelechies, that is, lives,
are different from dead forces. Dead forces perhaps
always arise from living forces, as it appears from the fact
that the conatus for receding from a center, which ought to
be counted among dead forces, arises from the living force
of rotation. But life or the primary entelechy is something
more than some simple dead conatus. (AG, 169; GM 3,
552)
      Even bodies apparently inanimate, that do not have, as living
immaterial substances, perceptions and appetition, still “have
something of that sort in them, as worms are in cheese” (AG, 169;
GM 3, 560). Consequently, only Cartesian or atomist matter is
‘dead matter’; instead, in any mote of dust, in the tiniest atoms,
there can be “worlds not inferior in beauty and variety to ours”. To
this Leibniz adds, to his correspondent’s imaginable astonishment,
this bewildering remark:
And (what could be considered even more amazing)
nothing prevents animals from being transported to such
worlds by dying, for I think that death is nothing but the
contraction of an animal, just as generation is nothing but
its unfolding. (AG, 169; GM 3, 553)
      Bewildering indeed, but corresponding precisely to the
standard treatment of death (and, less conspicuously, of birth)—
those events that ordinarily characterize finite beings, including
rational ones—in Leibniz’s mature philosophy: an overall denial.
3. According to Leibniz, individual substances, be they reasonable
or not, since they all are indivisible and incorporeal, can only be
created and destroyed by the supreme Author: “a substance can
begin only by creation and end only by annihilation” (AG, 42; A
VI 4, 1541). This implies, as Leibniz writes in a private note,
“either that souls are created every day, or, as I prefer, that they are
coeval with the world” (A VI 4, 1494). 
      If they last as long as the universe and, at the same time, they
are principles of life, thus never completely deprived of an organic
body, some consequences follow. Apparently there are two
primary meanings of life: one is the never-ending life of the
individual substance, or monad, in the created universe; the other
is the finite, indeed brief life of sentient and rational beings as we
ordinarily conceive of it; neither ends with a proper death, nor
does the end of ordinary life, and this is the more surprising part,
entail leaving this world. In fact, not only substances are
indestructible, but they also never abandon the created universe
until the end of time. In this setting, it is expectable that Leibniz’s
principal philosophical manifesto, the Système nouveau of 1695,
presents the following as the “greatest question” concerning souls:
what becomes of these souls or forms at the death of the
animal or at the destruction of the individual organized
substance? […] it hardly seems reasonable that souls
should remain uselessly in a chaos of confused matter.
(AG 140; GP 6, 480)
      There is only one reasonable view to take, according to
Leibniz, namely, “the conservation not only of the soul, but also of
the animal itself and its organic machine”; 6 this is made possible
by “the destruction of its larger parts”, that reduces it “to a
smallness which escapes our senses, just as it was before its birth”
(AG, 141; GP 6, 480). Leibniz, who had thought for a while that
6 Precisely from the conservation of the soul Leibniz declares to
assume that “the animal is also conserved, and that apparent
death is only an envelopment, there being no likelihood that in
the order of nature souls exist entirely separated from all
body” (Théod., §90; GP 6, 172). See also Hügli (1972),
Rensoli (1996), Smith (2007).
rational beings might get their soul by a special miraculous
creation, ends up with clinging exclusively to this theory of
transformation. As he states in §6 of the Principles of Nature and
Grace, 
There are small animals in the seeds of large ones, which,
through conception, assume new vestments that they
appropriate for themselves, which give them the means to
nourish themselves and grow in order to pass to a larger
stage and to bring about the propagation of the large
animal. 
      But the souls of human spermatic animals do not become
rational “until conception settles that these animals will have a
human nature”. Accordingly, since animals are not strictly born in
ordinary generation, “they do not fully perish in what we call
death”. They do not begin nor end in the order of nature: 
Thus, abandoning their mask or their tattered dress, they
merely return to a smaller stage, where they can,
nevertheless, be just as sensitive and as well-ordered as in
the larger. (AG, 209; GP 6, 601)
      These are the comely microscopic worlds to which, as we have
already seen, animals are being transported after death—which is
in truth a very different condition from that which Leibniz should
have shared with Plato beyond the Styx, that of forgetful separated
souls with a new transmigrated life. Both rational souls and, likely,
the merely sentient ones, come on the stage of the great universal
theatre only once, the same state of contraction occurring before
and after ordinary life.
And since there is no first birth or entirely new generation
of an animal, it follows that there will not be any final
extinction or complete death, in a strict metaphysical
sense. (AG, 141; GP 6, 481)
      This opposition of broad and strict sense, of ordinary and
‘metaphysical’ meaning of death, calls to mind a commentary by
Eugen Fink: “Elaborate understanding of being, i.e. metaphysics,
cannot conceive of death”: consequently, “Leibniz denies any
reality to death, and explains it as the extreme point of reduction
of clarity in representation. […] Death has lost its sting”. 7
Possibly so—and to take this sting away might well have been a
paramount concern of Leibniz’s, although he expressed it seldom.
4. Leibniz experienced death as unfathomable loss in 1705, when
Sophie Charlotte, queen of Prussia, who was Leibniz’s most
longstanding friend and inspirer in Berlin—and maybe the person
he held most dear in his whole life, as maybe a father or a
soupirant might have—this accultured, intelligent, open-minded,
lovely queen suddendly died at 36 of pneumonia. The gloomiest
circumstance 8 led Leibniz to discontinue a major philosophical
projects (the completion of his New Essays was abandoned and
publication happened not before 1765), and eventually to devote
himself to the Theodicy, that was among other aspects a literary
testament to the philosophical and theological discussions at the
Lutzenburg queenly palace.
      The sorrowing philosopher turned poet, as he sometimes did,
to expressed his wretchedness. He had done it eagerly as a student,
to show his prowess in Latin versification, and later to fulfil his
courtly duties with an impeccable poem on the death of Duke
Johann Friedrich, also in Latin. He had amused French
acquaintances with rhymes on the death of Mlle de Scudéry’s
parrot. But for this more personal mourning Leibniz had recourse
to his mother language, and composed a German Epicedium 9 of
7 “Das ausgearbeitete Seinsverständnis, die Metaphysik, kann
den Tod nicht denken. […] Leibniz leugnet die Realität des
Todes, deutet ihn in einen Extremwert der geringsten
Deutlichkeit des Vorstellens […] Der Tod hat hier keinen
Stachel” (Fink 1969, 187).
8 When Princess Sophie herself—Sophie Charlotte’s mother and
a lifelong backer, friend and correspondent—died in 1714,
Leibniz was in Vienna: he was not especially moved, neither
did he move for the funerals; indeed he left for Hanover only
when he knew that Sophie’s son had become king of Britain
and was departing for London with the court. 
9 All quotations will come from Hankins (1972).
more than one hundred tetrameter Alexandrine verses that is his
most inspired piece of poetry. Its technical refinement
notwithstanding, it is a quite emotional composition, that opens
comparing Sophie Charlotte’s death to the disappearance of a sun,
the very dissolution of Virtue and Beauty:
Der Preußen Königin verläst den Kreiß der Erden,
Und diese Sonne wird nicht mehr gesehen werden;
Des hohen Sinnes liecht, der wahren Tugend schein, 
Der Schönheit heller Glanz soll nun erloschen seyn.
      There was in her “something super-human” and this was the
“harshest of all losses”, invaluable and unredeemable. Only
remembrance—again—can give solace. But memories are double-
edged: they alone can sweeten our sorrow, and yet they have us
weep; they are all that remains, yet they make us sigh.
“Erinnerung allein ist was uns übrig bleibt. / Erinnerung allein ist
was uns Seufzer treibt”. Therefore such Erinnerung is refused: oh,
that she may be forgotten, Leibniz writes, that we may not think
that she is alive no more, and we find a dream to pleasure our soul,
instead of the deep sorrow that pierces our bosom:
Köndt so die Königin uns in Gedancken schweben,
Daß man nicht dächt dabey, wie Sie nicht mehr im Leben, 
So wär der süße Traum noch unser Seelen Lust,
Da nun der tieffe Schmerz durchdringt die schwehre Brust.
      Did all of her just disappear, asks Leibniz, like smoke that
drifts aways, like hours that go past? This raises grave theological
and metaphysical doubts: are human beings, God’s image and
likeness, nothing more than a dream, lasting less than sleep?
Ist Gottes Ebenbild, das Kunststück seiner Krafft,
So wenig als ein Traum im Schlaffe dauerhafft?
      No hint of contemptus mundi, though, appears in this poem, as
it would still be common at the time. Take into consideration, f.i.,
Friedrich von Spee. A 17th-century Jesuit whose poems were much
appreciated by Leibniz, he wrote about death in this fashion: “O
Narrheit groß, willst nackt und bloß / Bald, bald von hinnen
reisen; / Dein Hab und Gut, dein Frisches Blut / Soll Tod und
Würme speisen”. 10 Leibniz’s consolation is found, instead, in the
philosophical contemplation of the goodness of the created
universe, and of the creator’s wisdom. The latter is found in every
thing: “Die Weißheit läßet sich in allen Dingen spühren”. And
those souls who have a union with God, and possess reason so
they can adore him, who are indeed in this world like so many
small gods, these souls will forever be the citizens of his divine
republic. 
Die Seelen die mit Gott in Innung können treten, 
Die fähig ihr Verstand gemacht Ihn anzubeten,
Die kleine Götter seyn und ordnen was wie Er,
Die bleiben seines Staats Mitglieder immermehr.
      By what, again, would this eternal afterlife citizenship be
qualified? By not forgetting oneself, by not losing the sentiment of
self that founds their moral constitution:
Und werden nimmermehr, was sie nun seyn, vergeßen,
Sonst wären sie dem Lohn und auch der Straff entseßen.
      So memory comes back before us in the same role, that of the
basis of self-consciousness—the necessary condition of individual
suitability for morally qualified immortality. However, here it is
perfectly clear that this applies to the everlasting life that, in
Christian terms, follows the universal judgment. 11 For this world,
yet, would immortality be solely based on remembrance? Surely
such can be the case in metaphorical terms, and then remembrance
needs not always have a bitter taste for survivors or posterity, as
for Leibniz and Sophie Charlotte. Think of mathematicians, whose
immortal memory can be preserved by the attribution of a
10 ‘O big folly—you will so soon leave this world stripped and
naked. Your stuff, your goods, and your fair blood, shall
nourish death and worms’ (Spee 1908, 363).
11 And the share of the concerned is not clearly determined.
Although Leibniz refused in general terms Origenism and
universal salvation, his interest for such chiliastic perspective
is witnessed even in the Theodicy; see Costa 2014.
theorem: “A single momentous observation or demonstration is
enough to be immortalized and deserve the homage of future
generations” (A VI 4, 699). 
      That said, it is important to keep in mind what we have already
seen: that for Leibniz, in a way that is different from that of human
personal relations, death does not concern souls: they—indeed all
individual substances—are coeval with the created world, and do
not begin or end naturally. This brings us back to indestructibility,
and to what happens when an indestructible soul sees the end of its
corporeal life.
5.  “One short sleep past, we wake eternally”: thus sounds John
Donne’s description of the intermediate state of afterlife in his
sonnet Death, Be Not Proud. In Christian perspectives, between
one’s death and the universal resurrection there comes for the
separated soul either an immediate judgement, and the consequent
punishment, penitence, beatification, respectively; and this is in
particular the Catholic view, when purgatory be included. Or the
soul is put instead in a state of waiting, and either might be dead
and resurrected with the body on doomsday, or it must get a
pleasant slumber, and wake when Jesus “comes at the little tomb,
knocks, and says: Wake up, doctor Martinus!”—which is how
Luther (1883-2007, 37, 151) fancies it in a sermon. In fact, while
Calvin coins the word psychopannia to describe the vigilance of
the separated soul, Luther (1883-2007, 22, 99) teaches that after
death we enjoy a tranquil, “brief and sweet sleep”. 12
      The origins of this vision of death as sleep are usually traced
back by Christian writers to the words with which Jesus announces
his intention to resurrect Lazarus: “Our friend Lazarus sleepeth;
but I go, that I may awake him out of sleep”. The disciples do not
understand: “Jesus spake of [Lazarus’] death: but they thought that
12 Only in his late writings Luther finds a compromise with
Calvin’s position: the slumber of the separated soul would be
so deep, that the soul may be vigilant in a way, and hear and
see God and the angels (Luther 1883-2007, 43, 360); they
sleep in peace nonetheless: “certi sumus [post hanc vitam]
vivere animas, et dormire in pace” (43, 359).
he had spoken of taking of rest in sleep” (John 11:11-13). The
exchange ends in an abrupt manner Leibniz might not like: “Then
said Jesus unto them plainly, Lazarus is dead” (John 11:14). But
since Leibniz, as we shall see, shares in the end the Lutheran
vision of death as sleep in connection to his own view of birth and
death as transformations of imperishable beings, he mentions with
devotion this very passage:
there is no more difficulty in conceiving the preservation
of souls (or rather, on my view, of the animal), than in
conceiving the transformation of a caterpillar into a
butterfly, or the preservation of thought during sleep—to
which Jesus Christ has sublimely compared death. (RB,
58; NE Préf.; A VI 6, 58)
      No stroll beyond the Styx with a new body and no memories,
as it happens, for Leibniz. 13 “On my hypotheses”, he writes, souls
“inherently express” those portions of matter “with which they are
and must be united” in an orderly way. 
So if they passed into a new coarse or sensible body, they
would still retain the expression of everything of which
they had had any perception in the old one; and indeed the
new body would have to feel the effects of it, so that there
will always be real marks of the continuance of the
individual. (RB 240; NE II, 27, §14; A VI 6, 240)
13 Although he was unfavorable to any comparison between the
soul of a sleeper and the separated soul, “since the soul of the
sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal
images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated
soul”, yet Aquinas had already constructed an argument for
memory after death: memory can be referred to the “sensitive
part”, and thus to corporeal imagination; but also to “that part
of the imagination which pertains to the intellective faculty, in
so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time, since
it regards not only the past, but also the present, and the future
[…] Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will
remember” (Comm. Sent., l. 4, dist. 44, q. 3, sol. 2 ad 3um et 4um;
transl. according to Aquinas 1912-25, q. 70 art. 3 suppl.).
      Souls, after the apparent natural death, attached as they still are
to the tiny animal body that remains with them and that somehow
bears the marks of its past actions on the greater stage, fall into
slumber at the same time as they fall into microminiaturization. It
is “a long stupor, which arises from a great confusion of
perceptions”, that must not be confused “with death strictly
speaking, in which all perception cease” (AG, 208; GP 6, 600).
But how can this long etourdissement be compatible with the
exigency of continuity, and the memory that is thereby demanded,
as condition for personal morality, to which sleep seems contrary?
      A well-known doctrine of Leibniz’s is that concerning the so-
called ‘minute perceptions’. Halfway between representational
states of the individual substance that mirror the whole universe
from its point of view, and ordinary perceptions that are part of our
conscious perceptual life, they are perceptions of which, “we are
not aware in our present state”; “all our undeliberated actions
result from a conjunction of minute perceptions” and they are the
“insensible parts of our sensible perceptions”. 14 By virtue of these
minute perceptions, in every substance, and thus in the whole
universe, “the present is big with the future and burdened with the
past” (RB, 55; NE Préf.; A VI 6, 55).
      When considered in relation to the spiritual self, this allows for
a preciser explanation of the required continuity of personality that
we have already met, not only in perspective future life after the
universal judgement, but already in the stuporous condition of
worldly after-death:
These insensible perceptions also indicate and constitute
the same individual, who is characterized by the vestiges
or expressions which the perceptions preserve from the
individual’s former states, thereby connecting these with
his present state. (RB 240; NE II, 27, §14; A VI 6, 240)
      Those minute perceptions “also provide the means for
recovering this memory at need”, as a result of successive
14 RB 134, 115, 57; A VI 6, 134, 115, 57.
improvements which one may eventually undergo, maybe by the
intervention of  a superior mind. 
That is why death can only be a sleep, and not a lasting
one at that: the perceptions merely cease to be sufficiently
distinct; in animals they are reduced to a state of confusion
which puts awareness into abeyance but which cannot last.
(RB, 55; NE, Préf.; A VI 6, 55; my italics)
      We have now nearly all the ingredients of Leibniz’s anti-death
programme. Yet, still one point ought to be raised. This connection
of past, present, and future, corresponds to the metaphysical fact
that the various representational states of the individual substance
express themselves mutually: the substance represents at any
moment not only the present state of the universe, but the memory
of past states and the expression of its future states as well,
accompanied by an appetite toward its next state. This happens in
obedience only to an internal law of development, coessential with
the individual substance itself since its creation and equivalent to
that character of activity and primitive force that, as we have
already seen, characterizes Leibnizian substances. For this reason,
Leibniz maintains that his simple individual substances enjoy a
perfect spontaneity: “the true nature of what is spontaneous is to
be itself its own principle, and not something external”. 15 In the
Discourse on metaphysics, §32, Leibniz declares
that every substance has a perfect spontaneity (which
becomes freedom in intelligent substances), that
everything that happens to it is a consequence of its idea
or of its being, and that nothing determines it, except God
alone. (AG, 64; A VI 4, 1581)
      Leibniz adds at §33 that the very idea of the soul “carries with
it the fact that all its appearances or perceptions must arise
spontaneously from its own nature” (AG, 64; A VI 4, 1582),
faithfully corresponding to what happens in the rest of the universe
15 “Et in hoc consistit vera natura spontanei, ut ipsum sit
principium, non externum” (A VI 4, 1453). On this let me refer
readers to Pasini (2011).
and in particular in its own body. Eventually he explains to
Arnauld that “every present state of a substance happens to it
spontaneously and is only a result of its preceding state” (AG, 76;
A II 2, 53). 
      This implies another quite extraordinary aspect. It is true that
monads, in strict metaphysical terms, never die; but moreover,
when they naturally and ordinarily die, even if such circumstance
be most often repelled in their conscious mental life, yet then, in
strict metaphysical terms, they die spontaneously. 
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